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Conceptualizing and measuring social and emotional learning:  A systematic review and 




















 Responsible decision-making is a sub-domain of social emotional competence and 
develops through the educational process of social and emotional learning (SEL). The current 
review examines the relationship between decision-making, specifically, moral reasoning (MR) 
and academic ability (N = 6,992, 18), MR and religiosity (N = 3,441, 15), MR and political 
orientation (N = 12,814, 14) and MR and personality (N = 1,659, 8). Forty-three studies qualified 
for inclusion and analysis. The results indicated a positive effect between MR and academic 
ability (ES = + 0.24). Interestingly, small negative effects were found between MR and political 
orientation (ES = - 0.07). Results also indicated small non-significant effects between MR 
and religiosity (ES = +0.00, p = .94), and MR and personality (ES = + 0.01, p = .92). Possible 
interpretations of these findings are discussed with reference to the literature.  



















Conceptualizing and measuring social and emotional learning: A systematic review and 
meta-analysis of moral reasoning and academic ability, religiosity, political orientation, 
personality 
  
Set against a context of negative publicity and scandals that have marred the private and 
public sectors, and the backlash against globalization (Milanovic, 2016), there has perhaps never 
been a more important time to renew our focus on social and emotional learning (SEL). 
Newspaper columns are bursting with demonstrations of ethical misconduct by those in the 
highest echelons of society including: top executives being prosecuted for displaying 
discriminatory attitudes towards minorities or the opposite sex, banking bailouts, abuse of power, 
tax evasion, fraud, environmental degradation, waste disposal, physical abuse, government 
officials accepting gifts/donations and oppression in academia (Putnan, 2000; Taleb, 2007). 
Professionals across public and private industry are increasingly subjected to higher levels of 
scrutiny and accountability by media and interest groups. The penalties for unethical decision-
making can include a reduction in employees’ morale and public trust, damage to one’s 
reputation, humiliation, interruption to daily business routines, considerable fines and diminished 
interest from potential employees (Nash, 1993). In higher education the role of the academy is to 
encourage scholarly debate and challenge ideas in pursuit of truth. However, faculty and students 
are calling for protection from ideas and words they dislike propagating a fragility of the 
university psyche that can untimely prove dangerous to the scholarship and quality of the 

















responsibilities. It is critical to address the disregard for responsible decision-making in a society 
which has been evidenced by the global economic crisis (van Hoorn, 2015).  
SEL is important not only for individual behavior, but also in terms of shaping society as 
defined by its institutions, rules, and laws that facilitate societal level cooperation. However, 
little consensus has emerged on conceptualizing and measuring SEL. Furthermore, high quality 
research is needed to better understand SEL and its sub-domains (Domitrovich, Durlak, Staley, 
& Weissberg, 2017). Therefore, this study aims to examine responsible decision-making, one of 
the social emotional competence sub-domains, and explore the magnitude of the relationship 
between decision-making and a number of personal and psychological characteristics. 
Responsible decision-making is measured using the Defining Issues Test (DIT, Rest 1979a, Rest, 
Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999). In the next section the conceptual frameworks of social and 
emotional learning are examined, namely the association between moral reasoning (MR) and 
each of the following: academic achievement, religiosity, political orientation, and personality. A 
systematic review of the literature and meta-analysis was completed which helps to problematize 
these relationships. The methodology is described and findings are presented. Finally, possible 
ways of interpreting the findings are examined. 
Conceptual Frameworks 
The Collaborative for Social and Emotional Learning (CASEL) defined social and 
emotional learning (SEL) as “the process through which children and adults acquire and 
effectively apply the knowledge, attitudes, and skills necessary to understand and manage 

















maintain positive relationships, and make responsible decisions” (CASEL, 2018). CASEL 
developed an integrated Framework for Systemic Social and Emotional Learning comprising 
five competencies: “self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, relationship skills and 
responsible decision-making” (CASEL, 2015). Responsible decision-making was defined as 
one’s “ability to make constructive choices about personal behavior and social interactions based 
on ethical standards, safety concerns, and social norms” (CASEL, 2018). SEL interventions aim 
to promote the development of these interrelated competence areas (Authors, 2018; Domitrovich 
et al., 2017; Epstein, Griffin, & Botvin, 2000; Taylor, Oberle, Durlack & Weissberg, 2017; 
Weissberg, Durlack, Domitrovich & Gullotta, 2015).  
Another way of conceptualizing SEL can be derived from the ‘Big Five’ model of 
personality (Costa & McCrae, 1985). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development launched a study on social and emotional skills (SSES) of school children (OECD, 
2018) underpinned by this model. The study aims to capture a snapshot of two student groups 
aged 10 and 15 years, selected using a stratified random sampling technique across multiple 
countries. Direct assessments are used to measure students’ social emotional competence in 
addition to reports from parents and teachers. Anticipated study outcomes include a cross-
sectional dataset and instruments to measure students’ skills (OECD, 2015, 2017, 2018). 
Conceptualizing SEL using the 'Five-Factor Model (FFM) of personality' as a unifying 
framework could perhaps be seen as useful as the Big Five provides a well-established 
framework, supported by decades of empirical research, where essentially all social and 
emotional skills can be reflected. Furthermore, research suggests these traits can change during 

















Roberts, Walton & Viechtbauer, 2006). Personality is often assessed using self-report based 
measures (Authors, 2017). Similarly, SEL has traditionally been assessed using self-report 
measures (Taylor et al., 2017). While the ‘Big Five’ provides a framework to categorize 
personality, social emotional competence can be conceptualized differently as context-
dependent, inclusive of both knowledge and dispositions, and behaviorally based (Author, 
2012a; 2012b; Spengler, Damian & Roberts, 2018). Authors (2012b; 2013) suggest that social 
emotional competence should be conceptualized in two domains, ability/capacity and 
performance/achievement. Situational judgment tests (SJTs), arguably represent a promising 
measurement paradigm for social emotional competence (MacCann & Roberts, 2008) as they 
measure a respondent’s judgment with reference to particular situations by having them identify 
an appropriate response to scenarios (McDaniel, et al., 2007; Weekley, Ployhart, & Holtz, 2006; 
Wilhelm, 2005).  
Reconceptualizing and measuring social and emotional learning  
Given the many SEL frameworks and definitions it is important to discuss responsible 
decision-making from a historical perspective. Piaget (1932/1968) explored cognitive 
development from the position of psychological rationalism, and argued that children’s 
understanding of responsible decision-making was self-constructed and age-dependent. Kohlberg 
(1958) suggested a six-stage progression in an individual’s decision-making about the social 
world which aligned with Piaget’s theory of children’s reasoning of the physical world. Kohlberg 
(1958) outlined three sequential levels of decision-making or moral reasoning (MR): pre-

















individual’s decision regarding the most appropriate action in response to a particular situation. 
Kohlberg postulated that at the higher stages of his theory postconventional thinking, individuals 
may justify breaking the law while pursuing the greater good (Kohlberg, 1984). Kohlberg’s work 
and his measure, the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI), which defined “morality as justice while 
denigrating authority, hierarchy, and tradition” gave rise to over two decades (1970s-1990s) of 
research evidence supporting “worldviews that were secular, questioning, and egalitarian” 
(Haidt, 2012, p. 10).  
Rest et al. (1999a, 1999b) refined Kohlberg’s theory drawing upon various theoretical 
approaches including; cognitive developmental approaches, social learning, behavioristic, social 
psychological and psychoanalytic theory (Jagger, 2011; Rest at al., 1999a). Rest et al. (1999) 
differentiated between micro- and macro-morality. Micro-morality involved relationships with 
specific others (that is family, kin and friends) and examined the development of virtues within 
the individual. Micro-morality comprised rules of conduct that direct us in our individual moral 
decisions at the "micro-ethical" level that is, the level of individual behavior (Moor, 1999). 
Conversely macro-morality referred to the formal structures as defined by institutions, rules, 
laws and roles that facilitate societal level cooperation (Rest et al., 1999, 1999a, 1999b). Rest et 
al. (1999a, 1999b) suggested that responses to moral dilemmas activate schemata and use of 
these schemata can vary between individuals (Mayhew, Seifert & Pascarella, 2012; Thoma, 
2002). Three moral schemata were defined as “personal interest, maintaining norms and 
postconventional” schemata (Rest et al., 1997, p. 7). The maintaining norms and 
postconventional schemata were more progressive in achieving socio-centric perspectives rather 

















Postconventional thinking was facilitated by moral decisions that emanate from a shared 
ideology, which is open to scrutiny (Rest et al., 1999b). See complete description of MR outlined 
in Authors (2016).  
Given the myriad of SEL frameworks and definitions (Berg et al., 2017; Pellegrino & 
Hilton, 2012), it is perhaps not surprising that little consensus has emerged in the field regarding 
measurement. Similarly, many different measures of moral decision-making exist including: the 
Sociomoral Reflection Measure (Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller, 1992); the Hahm-Beller Values 
Choice Inventory (Hahm, Beller & Stoll, 1989); the Managerial Moral Judgment Test (Loviscky 
et al., 2007); and the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2008). Some 
of these measures are self-report (e.g., the Measure of Prosocial Moral Reasoning, PROM, Carlo, 
Eisenberg & Knight, 1992), while others employ interview techniques to measure MR (Moral 
Judgement Interview, Kohlberg, 1984). Some purport to measure the alignment of belief and 
action (e.g., Moral Competency Inventory, Martin & Austin, 2010), while others distinguish 
between affective or cognitive aspects of MR (Moral Competence Test, Lind, 2016). Some 
authors have adapted existing measures or combinations of measures to capture context specific 
MR (e.g. Loviscky et al., 2007; Rudd et al., 2010; Söderhamn et al., 2011) or facets of moral 
action (Tirri, 2011; Tirri & Nokelainen, 2011).  
In this study responsible decision-making was measured using the Defining Issues Test 
(DIT1, Rest, 1979a; DIT2, Rest, Narvaez, Thoma & Bebeau, 1999). Similar to a situational 
judgement test, the DIT1 presents the respondent with six hypothetical dilemmas; participants 

















what course of action to take (Rest, 1979a). The revised DIT2 is shorter, including five 
contemporary dilemmas and associated items (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma & Bebeau, 1999). The 
DIT1 is highly correlated (.95 to .99) with the DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999, p. 651). In comparison to 
alternative measures of MR and decision-making, the DIT has various strengths making it 
appropriate for use in this area. First, the specific focus on cognitive skills of processing moral 
schemata means that the DIT measures something discrete as compared with constructs using 
broad personality-type variables (Thoma, Derryberry & Narvaez, 2009; Thoma, Narvaez, Rest & 
Derryberry 1999). Second, framed by a focus on macro-moral issues, schemata scores provide 
insights into an individual’s ability to conceptualise societal cooperation. Finally, the DIT 
measures reasoning directly, and does not rely on self-report or 360-evaluation mechanisms. The 
combination of these factors strengthens the validity of the DIT as a measure of decision-making 
as compared with other self-report measures. The DIT has been highlighted as a robust measure 
of MR and maintains adequate reliability and validity (Author, 2016; Bailey, 2011; Thoma, 
2006).  
Using a sequence of ratings, rankings, and a weighted algorithm, the DIT measures how 
respondents use certain principles to frame decision-making in response to a moral dilemma. The 
DIT produces several indices to determine MR however; in this study we used P-Score and the 
composite N2-score. P score, which stands for principled score, is the weighted average of 
postconventional items chosen across the five/six dilemmas. The N2 score aggregates how the 
respondent clearly discriminates between DIT items (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003) and has been 
identified as demonstrating superior performance for construct validity (Rest et al., 1999). 

















higher endorsement of postconventional items (socio-centric perspectives, Thoma, 2002). Lower 
scores reflect moral reasoning from an egocentric perspective. The “upward bound estimate for 
the correlation between the two ‘true scores’ DIT1-N2 and DIT2-N2 (including correction for 
attenuation) is .95 to .99” (Rest et al., 1999 p. 651). The What Works Clearinghouse (WWC, 
2014) requirements for outcome measures are internal consistency reliability of .50 or higher.  
Responsible decision-making, one of the social emotional competence domains is aligned 
conceptually with the MR framework, sharing the dimension of responsible decision-making. It 
seems reasonable to suggest that the theoretical frameworks of MR, measurement using the 
Defining Issues Test, and the SEL framework, particularly, responsible decision-making share 
substantial features. Therefore including the DIT as a complementary measure of responsible 
decision-making, could advance SEL assessment and intervention research. Reflective of the 
investment in SEL programs, it is important that social emotional competence is evaluated using 
robust assessments.  
Individual characteristics and responsible decision-making 
Moral reasoning and academic achievement  
Research suggests that academic engagement enhances the use of postconventional MR 
(Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991; 2005). Not surprisingly, “the greater the student’s involvement or 
engagement in academic work or in the academic experience of college – the greater the 
knowledge acquisition and general cognitive development” (Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991, p. 
616). Previous research highlights several studies that report significant positive associations 

















Crowson, DeBacker & Thoma, 2007; Derryberry et al., 2005; Mayhew, 2012; Mayhew et al., 
2012; Thoma, Derryberry & Narvaez, 2009). Others report significant positive correlations 
between measures of MR and GPA (Grade Point Average) scores (Abdolmohammadi & Baker, 
2007; Cottone et al., 2007; Traiser & Eighmy, 2011). However, a number of studies also report 
divergent findings. Cooper and Schwartz (2007) indicate that GPA scores were not significantly 
associated with MR. While Marx et al. (2007) report a non-significant association between MR 
and verbal ability (measured using Stankov’s Gf/Gc Quickie Test Battery). Equally, Tirri and 
Pehkonen (2002) report that intellectual giftedness scores (measured using the Raven’s test) did 
not predict MR. Differences across studies may be explained by the number of factors that can 
influence academic achievement including parental and peer influence and motivation (Authors, 
2017).  
It is also worth noting the influence of verbal intelligence in DIT performance, which has 
been acknowledged, with Rest (1979) suggesting that correlations between MR and intelligence 
were stronger where studies evaluated verbal and non-verbal intelligence. This is not surprising 
as like other measures of cognitive ability, the DIT Manual states the reading level, or book band 
of the DIT is 12-13 years or equal, indicating some verbal intellectual ability is required to 
complete the measure. This is echoed by Thoma (2002) who argued that cognitive tests should 
be associated with other measures of cognitive ability. However, associations should not be 
excessive, otherwise it could be argued the DIT measures general cognitive ability and not 
specifically MR. Thoma, Derryberry and Narvaez (2009, p. 173) suggested that “DIT scores 
describe a latent variable that is distinct from verbal ability.” Sanders et al. (1995) challenged 

















most salient marker of general intelligence” (p. 502). The authors reported that gifted individuals 
achieved higher scores than college freshmen, who were on average four to five years their 
senior, vouching that these results were due to superior verbal ability rather than any other 
psychological variables. Thoma et al. (1999) rebutted suggesting that the DIT, a cognitive index 
of MR, does not relate robustly with the non-cognitive criterion as described by Sanders et al. 
(1995). The summary of relevant DIT literature as provided by Thoma and his colleagues 
suggests that “moral judgement development as measured by the DIT provides a unique source 
of information that cannot be explained by general/verbal ability or political attitudes” (Thoma et 
al., 1999, p. 325). 
Moral reasoning and religiosity  
The concept of religiosity is complex and evolving. James (1902, p. 32) defines religion 
as “the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their solitudes.” This understanding 
developed to include definitions of religion as organisational and a ritual; and advanced the 
discussion of spirituality from the perspective of the personal, experiential and affective 
(Pargament, 1999; Stifoss-Hanssen, 1999). Previous meta-analysis have focused on religiosity 
and various anti-social behaviours including crime, delinquency and prejudice (Baier & Wright, 
2001; Broussard, 2015; Hall et al., 2010; Kelly et al., 2015; McCleary et al., 2011), religiosity 
and health outcomes (Hemmati et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2015); the impact of religiosity on 
educational outcomes (Jeynes, 2004); the relationship between religiosity and personality trait 
domains (Lodi-Smith & Roberts, 2007); the relationship between religiosity and marital or 

















treatment (Captari et al., 2018; Jim et al., 2015;  McCullough, 1999). However the focus of the 
current meta-analysis is specifically decision-making as measured by the DIT and religiosity.  
Set against a context of globalization, international migration, secularization and the 
changing role of religion in public life (Berry, 2016; Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017; Hall et al., 
2010;  Nash, 2005, Noddings, 2005; Rizvi & Lingard, 2010), the relationship between MR and 
religiosity should be considered as individuals become increasingly polarized perusing social 
agendas that require justification and defence of the team to which they belong (Abu-Nimer, 
2001, 2004; Altemeyer, 2003; Haidt, 2012; Tirri & Nokelainer, 2011). Previous research 
suggests religiosity is correlated with MR, that is, lower scores of MR are correlated with more 
fundamental or conservative religious beliefs (Glock & Stark, 1996; Parker, 1990). While this 
research seems to corroborate Rest’s findings that religiosity does not equate directly with higher 
MR scores (Rest et al., 1999a), an inconsistent picture emerges across the research. Some authors 
report significant relationships between religiosity (as measured by religious belief/commitment) 
and MR (Wimalasiri, 2001, 2004; Coleman & Wilkins 2002; 2004; Drake, Griffin, Kirkman & 
Swann, 2005). Walker, Thoma, Jones, and Kristjánsson (2017) report that religious practice and 
religious identification predict higher scores of MR. While others point to non-significant 
relationships between MR and religious affiliation (Maeda, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2009) and 
religious participation (Wilhelm, 2004). Exploring the relationship between religiosity and MR is 
important to facilitate improved understanding of the impact of local, national and cultural norms 
on decision making capacity. This is perhaps a neglected area in the social and emotional 
learning field, and requires further evidence particularly for developing effective interventions.  

















Moral reasoning has consistently been linked to an individual’s political ideology when 
viewed through the lens of liberalism versus conservatism (Rest et al., 1999a). Political ideology 
was defined as a “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved” 
(Erikson & Tedin, 2003, p. 64), and is  frequently conceptualized as left or right (Kahn et al., 
2018). In the US, the concepts of "liberal"/"left" and "conservative"/"right" are frequently used 
to indicate policy preferences, however the phrases ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ are used more 
frequently (Kahn et al., 2018). In examining the relationship between MR and political 
orientation, it should be acknowledged that individuals with varying political ideologies 
undoubtedly hold different beliefs which inform how they conceptualize and achieve societal 
cooperation. For example, Emile Durkheim’s (1912) work supports the notion that conservatives 
value the foundation of authority and loyalty. While Thoma et al. (2009) observe that liberals 
possess greater “conceptual development in how to organize cooperation” at a macro level (p. 
327) thus leading them to yield higher MR scores. Alternatively Haidt (2012) suggests that those 
who ascribe to a liberalist perspective have a narrow moral outlook, concerning themselves with 
the relief of suffering and fairness, aligning with individualistic values. Conservatives, however, 
concern themselves with loyalty and authority also - values aligned with social cohesiveness and 
“reinforcing ties amongst its members” (Blum, 2013, p. 299).  
Meta-analytic research is a powerful technique for understanding political orientation and 
MR, facilitating more nuanced interpretations of the “collapse of cooperation across party lines” 
(Haidt, 2012, p. xi). Previous meta-analyses have focused on political party affiliation and 
political ideology (Cruz, 2017); political awareness (Görtz, 2018); political scandals (Von 

















voter turnout (Cancela & Geys, 2016; Geys, 2006; Stockemer, 2016) the relationship between 
political orientation and prejudice (Broussard, 2015; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003; 
Terrizzi, Shook & McDaniel, 2013); the impact of internet use on political engagement 
(Boulliane, 2009) and the relationship between opinion climate and expression (Matthes, Knoll, 
& von Sikorski, 2018). However the focus of the current meta-analysis is specifically decision-
making as measured by the DIT and political orientation.  
DIT researchers regard political orientation and MR as autonomous constructs (e.g. 
Crowson et al., 2007; Thoma et al., 1999) with Thoma and Dong (2014, p. 57) suggesting that 
“the distinction between conventionality and post-conventionality is what tends to drive so many 
public policy disputes such as the reactions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, how best to 
stimulate an economy, minority rights, religion in the schools, medical policy, and so on”. For 
instance, individuals that endorse the maintaining norms moral schemata value existing roles and 
formal organizational structures as the basis for cooperation in society and are therefore less 
open to change. Alternatively, individuals who subscribe to postconventional moral schemata are 
more inclined to query the status quo and therefore are more open to social change (Maeda et al., 
2009). Rest et al. (1999a) report that MR was significantly associated with political attitudes and 
political choices (in the range r = .40 to .60) and show discriminant validity from political 
attitudes either conservative or liberal (Thoma et al., 1999). A number of studies support this 
contention indicating a significant association between political orientation and MR, that is, 
those individuals who identified as liberal had higher scores of MR (Abdolmohammadi & Ariail, 
2009; Maeda et al., 2009; Marx et al., 2007; Mayhew et al., 2012; Narvaez et al., 1999; Thorne, 

















indicate that no significant relationship emerged between MR and political orientation (Ashe & 
Hettihew, 2011; Bailey, 2011; Crowson et al., 2007; Mayhew, 2012; Wilhelm & Czyzewski, 
2006). Synthesizing the relationship between political orientation and MR is critical in 
facilitating a deeper understanding of why individuals adopt particular positions about macro-
moral issues, such as fairness, equity and corruption. In doing so, the current study can help 
advance understanding of the potential of SEL to contribute at individual and societal level. 
Moral reasoning and personality  
“It would be surprising if personality constructs had no bearing on the ways that people 
relate to others and to society” (Dollinger & LaMartina, 1998, p. 350), therefore at the outset it is 
expected that MR is correlated with various traits of personality. Rest (1988, p. 192) suggests 
“the picture we now have of the conditions for moral [reasoning] development involve both 
person characteristics and environmental characteristics”. Since the seminal work in personality 
trait theory (Allport, 1937; Tupes & Christal, 1961) there is, to an extent, a degree of consensus 
of a five-factor model that “may adequately describe the structure of personality” (Maltby et al., 
2007, p. 170). These five factors are agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, openness to 
experience (Intellect), and neuroticism (emotional stability). Together, they are referred to as the 
Big Five Framework, often assessed using personality inventories (Costa & McCrae, 1985; 
Goldberg et al., 2006). The Big Five framework is advocated as the prevailing approach in 
personality research (Barrio, Aluja & Garcia, 2004; Matthews & Deary, 1998) due to ease of 
assessment. Costa and McCrae (1992) suggest that the Big Five personality factors comprise the 
majority of the individual variance in behavioral patterns, and therefore are suitable for 

















In terms of MR, the maintaining norms schema considers how people should cooperate 
within society at large, and is a prevalent first solution to conceptualizing whole community 
based (society-wide) cooperation (Narvaez, 2002). Moral decisions are framed from the 
perspective of maintaining the status quo, where the community and all who take part in said 
community are governed by accepted colloquial social norms. These norms are upheld/enforced 
by hierarchical roles and structures; in other words, “one must obey authorities, not necessarily 
out of respect for the personal qualities of the authority, but out of respect for the social system” 
(Narvaez, 2002, p.6). One personality trait domain, "conscientiousness," seems conceptually 
similar to the maintaining norms schema. McCrae and Costa (1990) define conscientious 
individuals as "adhering scrupulously to their moral precepts and rigorously fulfilling their social 
and civic duties" (p. 45), and, noted that "(L)ow scorers are not necessarily lacking in moral 
principles, but they are less exacting in applying them” (Costa & McCrae, 1992, p. 16).  
Loevinger’s (1966) theory of ego development examines individual differences in adult 
personality and includes stages of psychological maturation beginning in childhood that develop 
through adolescence and adulthood (Loevinger & Wessler, 1970). These stages describe how 
individuals function interpersonally and intrapersonally with regards to cognitive complexity, 
conscious preoccupations and impulse control (Loevinger, 1976). In this work, Lovienger (1994) 
challenged the consensus of a five-factor model of personality. Rather, she suggested her ego 
development theory together with Kohlberg’s conceptualization of moral development offered 
“an integrated and structural aspect of personality and character that is not accessible to tests that 
can be treated with factorial methods” (p. 3). In elaborating this point, she theorized that the 

















While one of the five-factors of personality is labelled conscientiousness, Lovienger (1966, 
1994) asserts that it measures a different construct - ‘conformity’ which she describes as 
following the rules and where appearance and social acceptance is imperative. According to 
Lovienger’s theory, conscientiousness is perhaps more a tendency toward conformity and 
maintaining the status quo, suggesting that conscientiousness may be negatively correlated with 
MR. 
Equally, one may hypothesise a relationship between openness to experience (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992) and MR, as the cognitive skills required, described as philosophical, abstract-
thinking, being inquisitive and reflective could improve levels of MR. Openness to experience is 
included as one of the ‘Big Five’ personality traits and encompasses receptivity to experience, an 
open mind, absorption, creativity, and openness to feelings (McCrea, 1987; McCrea & Costa, 
1990; Costa & McCrae, 1992). Similar to MR, openness includes intellectual performance 
among its typical correlates “however, it seems to involve much more than sheer intellectual 
power ... It also includes an independence of thought that refuses to be constrained by social or 
normative boundaries (Dollinger & LaMartina, 1998, p. 351.) 
Some studies report significant relationships between measures of personality and levels 
of MR (Hren et al., 2006, 2011; Heinze et al., 2010; Lan et al., 2008, 2010; Mudrack 2006). 
Others however have reported non-significant relationships using a variety of measurements 
(Forte, 2005; Sechler, 2000; Traiser, 2007; Traiser & Eighmy, 2011). The focus of the current 

















personality. Examining the relationship between personality and MR advances our understanding 
of the relationships between psychological characteristics and decision-making capacity.  
 
Method 
This study aimed to explore the magnitude of the relationship between MR and a number 
of personal and psychological characteristics. Establishing a consistent empirical link between an 
individual’s level of MR and various measures of personal and psychological characteristics 
proves to enhance our understanding of the processes required for postconventional MR. It also 
facilitates deeper thought in terms of providing targeted interventions with a view to facilitating 
MR development. This study examines two research questions: 
Q.1 Is there a relationship between MR and participants’ individual characteristics 
(academic achievement, political orientation and religiosity)? 
Q.2 Is there a relationship between MR and participants’ psychological characteristics 
(personality)?  
Search procedures  
The authors conducted a search to identify studies that explored the measurement of MR 
from 1999 to 2018 using the DIT. This time frame was selected as the DIT2 was developed in 
1999 and began to replace usage of the original DIT. Most research approached the study of MR 
from a psychological perspective, theorizing ontological foundations; investigating the 

















demographic variables. Also included were a number of studies that attempted to understand 
how curricular or extracurricular interventions related to MR capacity. 
Informed by the methods suggested by Lipsey and Wilson (2001) and Glass, McGaw and 
Smith (1981), this review included the following steps: a search was conducted to identify 
possible studies; studies were screened for inclusion against a preset criteria; included studies 
were coded for design and substantive features. Electronic searches were conducted of 
educational databases (including, ERIC, EBSCO, PsycINFO, Dissertation Abstracts), web-based 
repositories, and recent tables of contents of key journals, using different combinations of 
keywords. References from other reviews of MR were examined (for example, Cummings, 
Maddux, Richmond & Cladianos, 2010; Cummings, Dyas, Maddux & Kochman, 2001). Our 
search terms included “moral reasoning”, “defining issues test (DIT)” and “personality”, 
academic ability/achievement”, “political orientation” and “religious belief/commitment”. The 
initial search procedures yielded 285 studies, these studies were appraised against pre-set 
inclusion criteria. 
Selection criteria  
Studies included in this meta-analysis had to a) use the Defining Issues test (DIT1 or 
DIT2) as a measure of MR, b) incorporate a measure of academic ability/achievement, 
personality, political orientation, or religiosity and c) include adequate information to calculate 
effect sizes from zero-order correlations. Studies had to be written in English but could have 
been conducted in any country. Having applied the selection criteria 43 studies were included in 

















measures of religiosity, 14 reporting measures of political orientation, and 8 reporting 
personality. 
Each of the studies were coded for sample size, MR index (P/N2), and the magnitude of 
the relationship between psychological/personal characteristics and MR score. Academic ability 
included a variety of measurements including ACT (American College Testing), GPA (Grade 
Point Average), crystallised intelligence and verbal ability measures. The personality category 
reflected a number of measures including the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, the MACH-IV test 
of Machiavellianism, the Psychopathic Personality Inventory and Rotter's I-E Scale. Religiosity 
included measures of bible knowledge, religious fundamentalism, the Spiritual Experience Index 
and the DIT index, religious orthodox, while political orientation reflected measures of political 
liberalism/conservatism.  
Meta-analysis procedures  
The index of effect size was the conventional correlation coefficient (r). Comprehensive 
Meta-Analysis (V3, Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins & Rothstein, 2016) software was employed to 
conduct all the analyses. The random model rather than the fixed model was used in the present 
study since the Q-test showed that the magnitude of the effect varied substantially across studies 
depending on types of intervention, representativeness of the sample, etc. (Borenstein et al., 
2009). One-study removed analysis was employed to determine if there were any outliers that 
could potentially skew the overall effect size. To explore moderator effects, mixed-effects 
analysis was used. The Classic fail-safe N (Rosenthal, 1979) test and Orwin’s fail-safe N (Orwin 



















Forty-three studies qualified for inclusion in the final analysis: 18 studies included 
measures of MR and academic ability (N = 6,992), 15 studies included measures of MR and 
religiosity (N = 3,441), 14 studies included measures of MR and political orientation (N = 
12,814) and 8 studies included measures of MR and personality (N = 1,659) [where N refers to 
the total number of participants across relevant studies]. Table 2 displays the overall mean effect 
sizes for MR and academic ability, MR and religiosity, MR and political orientation, and MR 
and personality were +0.24, -0.00, -0.07, and +0.01, respectively. A random effects model was 
used to account for the distribution of effect sizes in this collection of studies (QB = 61.96, df 
=18, p < 0.001, QB = 74.46, df = 15, p = 0.76, QB = 96.27, df = 14, p = 0.02, QB = 317.01, df = 7, 
p = 0.92, respectively). This finding indicates that the variation of effect sizes for these studies 
was highly heterogeneous.  
Academic Achievement  
This analysis included 18 studies with 19 independent effect sizes for correlations 
between MR and academic ability. Nine studies included in the final analysis used ACT (or its 
equivalent) as a measure of academic achievement (Authors, 2016; Crowson, 2002; Crowson et 
al., 2007; Hevel Martin, Weeden, & Pascarella, 2015; Derryberry et al., 2005; Mayhew, 2012; 
Mayhew, Pascarella, Trolian & Selznick, 2015; Parker et al., 2016; Thoma et al., 2009). Four 
studies used GPA scores (Peeters & Boddu, 2016; Sisola, 2000; Traiser, 2007; Traiser & 
Eighmy, 2011). The remaining five studies used a variety of measures including: the Kaufman 

















2007); the Gf/Gc Quickie Test Battery (Stankov, 1997) (Marx et al., 2007); Academic Profile 
(Nelson, 2004); the Graduate Record Exam (Nodie Oja, et al., 2011); and the Wechsler Adult 
intelligence Scale (Wechsler, 1955) (Skoe & von der Lippe, 2002).   
Religiosity 
The current review included 15 studies reporting measures of religiosity. Three of the 
studies included in the final analysis used a situational judgement test (DIT religious orthodox 
score, Rest, 1979a; Rest et al., 1999) to capture religiosity (Behar-Horenstein & Garvan, 2016, 
Drake, Griffin, Kirkman & Swann, 2005, Wilhelm & Chaichompoo, 2015). The DIT index, 
religious orthodox represents the sum of the rates and ranks for item 9 in the doctor's dilemma 
(DIT1) and the cancer story included in the DIT2. Item 9 evokes the notion that only God can 
determine whether or not someone should live or die. This variable is computed by adding the 
rating given to item 9 with the ranking value – thus lower scores indicate higher levels of 
religiosity. 
Thoma, Derryberry and Narvaez (2009) measured religiosity using Brown and Lowe's 
15-item Inventory of Religious Belief (1951). Items are measured using a 5-point Likert-type 
scale. Scores on the Brown-Lowe range from 15 to 75. Higher scores indicate strong literal 
Christian belief. Prior research (Narvaez et al., 1999) report Cronbach's alpha of .95 for the 
measure. Thomas and Dunphy (2014) measured religiosity using the Batson and Ventis 
Religious Orthodoxy Scale (Batson & Ventis, 1982). The Batson and Ventis Religious 
Orthodoxy Scale measures respondents’ perception of religion as a quest. Religion as a quest 

















answers” (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991, 430). The Batson and Ventis (1982) scale adapted the 
Christian Orthodoxy Scale Religious Orthodoxy Scale (Glock & Stark, 1966).  
Morton, Worthley, Testerman and Mahoney (2006) assessed religiosity using Genia’s 23-
item Spiritual Experience Index (SEI; 1997) and a measure of religious belief. Genia’s (1997) 
SEI items were summed to form a spiritual maturity index (α=.73) (Morton et al., 2006). Higher 
scores indicate individuals reported a mature commitment to spirituality without being dogmatic 
or intolerant of ambiguity. Religious belief was measured using responses to five items (α=.90): 
“worship service attendance, prayer frequency, commitment to Jesus, importance of faith and the 
sense that God is guiding you” (Morton et al., 2006, p. 393). Higher scores indicated that an 
individual held a world view where their maintaining norms schema included religious beliefs. 
Nelson (2004) assessed religiosity using the Standardized Bible Content Test (American 
Association of Bible Colleges, 1991). Form E of this measure comprises 150 multiple choice 
questions, with higher scores indicating higher levels of Bible knowledge.  
Two studies measured religiosity using a self-report of religious preference or affiliation.  
Wimalasiri (2001) firstly categorized respondents by broad religious tradition including Catholic, 
Protestant, Buddhist, Hindu, No Religion, Others. Religious commitment was measured by 
asking respondents to rate their degree of commitment on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = no 
commitment to 5 = strongly committed). Tatum et al. (2013) measured religious preference using 
the following categories None, Protestant and Roman Catholic. Due to an insufficient number of 
participants, a number of other categories were excluded from the final analysis including 
Eastern Orthodox Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Muslim, and Undisclosed. Wilhelm (2004) measured 

















somewhat active, highly active, and extremely active). Wade (2015, p. 144) requested 
respondents to select “the item in each set that is closest to your personal point-of-view … a) I 
attend church, synagogue, or regularly scheduled spiritual meetings often. b) I do not attend 
church, synagogue, or regularly scheduled spiritual meetings often.” Wimalasiri (2004) 
measured religiosity with a self-report of religious commitment (5-point Likert-type scale, 1 = no 
commitment to 5 = strongly committed). 
Coleman and Wilkins (2002) measured religiosity using a religious composite score 
which included: religious affiliation (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, none and other) and religious 
belief (7 = extremely liberal to 1 = extremely fundamentalist). Coleman and Wilkins (2004) 
requested participants to self-report their degree of religiosity (extremely religious = 7 to 
extremely nonreligious = 1) and religious beliefs (extremely fundamentalist = 7 to extremely 
liberal =1).  Finally, Maeda et al. (2009) measured religiosity using self-reported religious 
affiliation of the higher education institution (secular vs. religious schools). Religious affiliation 
was categorized dichotomously, with a code of 1 for a religious school and 0 for a secular 
school. 
Political Orientation 
Fourteen included studies reported measures of political orientation. Eleven of the 
fourteen studies included in the final analysis used a self-report Likert-type scale to capture 
political orientation ranging from liberal to conservative. Three studies used the five-point 
Likert-type scale (ranging from very liberal to very conservative) included in the DIT to capture 
political orientation (Behar-Horenstein & Garvan, 2016, Maeda, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2009, 

















scale (ranging from 1 = extremely liberal to 5 = extremely conservative) to measure political 
orientation. They also used a 2-point forced-choice political identification scale (0 = liberal, 
1=conservative) and a 2-point forced-choice political party identification scale (0 = democrat, 1 
= republican). Crowson, DeBacker and Thoma (2007) used a five-point Likert-type scale 
(ranging from 1 = liberal to 5 = conservative) to measure political orientation. Hevel, Martin, 
Weeden, and Pascarella (2015) used a five-point Likert-type scale (ranging from 1 = far 
left/liberal to 5 = far right/conservative) to measure political orientation. Mayhew, Pascarella, 
Trolianand Selznick (2015) used a five-point Likert-type scale (ranging from 1 = far left/liberal 
to 5 = far right/ conservative), similar to the Wabash National Study of Liberal Arts Education, 
to measure political orientation. Narvaez, Getz, Rest and Thoma (1999) used a five-point Likert-
type scale (ranging from 1 = liberal to 5 = conservative) to measure political orientation. Parker, 
Barnhardt, Pascarella and McCowin (2016) used a five-point Likert-type scale (ranging from1 = 
far left/ liberal to 5 = far right/conservative) to measure political orientation. Crowson (2004) 
used a seven-point Likert-type scale (ranging from 1 = extremely liberal to 7 = extremely 
conservative) to measure political orientation. Passini (2014) used a 10-point Likert-type scale 
(ranging from 1 = extreme left/liberal to 10 = extreme right/conservative) to measure political 
orientation. 
Crowson, Thoma and Hestevold (2005) used a number of measures in study 1 to capture 
political orientation including: the Right-Wing Authoritianism (RWA) Scale (Altemeyer, 1988). 
The RWA scale comprises 30 items and purports to measure three traits: authoritarian 
submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. Higher scores indicate greater levels 

















They also used the Conservatism–Liberalism Scale (McClosky & Bann 1979) to measure 
political orientation. McClosky and Bann’s Conservatism–Liberalism Scale comprised 26 items 
reflecting conservative attitudes toward economic, social, and political issues. Higher scores 
reflect greater compliance with conservative political attitudes. Cronbach’s alpha was adequate 
for the study sample (α = .66). Crowson, Thoma and Hestevold (2005) also used measures of 
political orientation in study 2 including: the Right-Wing Authoritianism (RWA) Scale 
(Altemeyer, 1988), the Conservatism–Liberalism Scale (McClosky & Bann 1979), and 
Conservative Political Identification (ranging from 1 = extremely liberal to 7 = extremely 
conservative).  
 
Rizzo and Swisher (2004) used a three-point Likert-type scale to measure political 
orientation (Conservative/Moderate/Liberal). Finally, Marx, Soames Job, White and Wilson 
(2007) used a 28-item scale to measure political orientation. Respondents were required to 
indicate whether or not they supported each of 28 political policies (e.g. death penalty, abortion) 
on a 5-point Likert-type scale (ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). Items 
were gathered from a range of sources including other measures (political measures; Collins & 
Hayes, 1993) relevant literature, political textbooks and political items in the news at the time. 
Cronbach’s alpha was adequate for the study sample α = .85. 
Personality 
Eight included studies reported measures of personality including: the Attributional 
Complexity Scale (ACS; Fletcher et al., 1986), High Pole Openness to experience (HPO, 

















Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI, Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996), the MACH-IV (Christie 
& Geis, 1970) (Heinze et al., 2010); the Machiavellianism Scale (Milas, 1998), the Paulhus 
Socially Desirable Responding scales (SDR, Paulhus, 2002) (Hren, et al., 2006); the California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (CPI, Gough, 1975) (Mudrack, 2006); the Ethical Rating A and B 
(Richmond Pope, 2004); and finally the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI, Raskin & Hall, 
1979) (Traiser & Eighmy, 2011).  Sechler (2000) administered measures of broad personality 
domains as classified by the author including: the EF1-EF12 (Simmons & Simmons, 1997), the 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Briggs, 1987) and the Science Teaching Efficacy Belief 
Instrument (STEBI, Riggs & Enochs, 1990) (Sechler, 2000). 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Results from the one-study removed analysis showed that the range of effect sizes was 
still between the 95% confidence interval of the overall effect size (MR and academic ability, 
between +0.19 and +0.28; MR and religiosity, between -0.08 and +0.08; MR and political 
orientation, between -0.13 and -0.01; MR and personality, between -0.16 and +0.17). In other 
words, the removal of any one effect size did not substantially influence the overall effect. 
Publication Bias 
 Classic fail-safe N and Orwin’s fail-safe N analyses were used to check for robustness. 
The Classic fail-safe N test indicated that 1323 studies (MR and academic ability), 16 studies 
(MR and religiosity), 134 studies (MR and political orientation) and 73 studies (MR and 
personality) with null results were required for the effect to be nullified. The Orwin’s test 

















effect size at a level that would be considered trivial. This study set the trivial value at a 0.01 
level. Results suggest that the total number of missing null studies needed to approximate an 
overall mean effect size of 0.01 was 344 (MR and academic ability), 56 (MR and religiosity), 
111 (MR and political orientation) and 121 (MR and personality). Overall, the findings suggest 
the effect size observed were not driven by publication bias. 
Sample Size 
Previous research indicates that studies with small sample sizes tend to produce a much 
larger effect size that those with large sample sizes (Liao, 1999). As indicated in Table 3, 
statistically significant differences were found between large studies and small studies for MR 
and academic ability (p < 0.01), and for MR and political orientation (p < 0.01). However, no 
statistically significant differences were found between the large studies and the small studies for 
MR and religiosity. The results obtained should however be interpreted with caution due to the 
small number of studies in each category. Moderator analysis was not conducted for MR and 
personality as there was only 1 study with a sample size > 250.  
Discussion 
Social emotional learning, comprising responsible decision-making, is crucial for success 
in school (Author, 2018; Domitrovich et al., 2017) and has been associated with important long 
term health and labor market outcomes (Belfield et al., 2015; Deming, 2017; Moffitt et al., 
2011). The current study aimed to explore the relationship between MR (responsible decision-
making) as measured by the DIT and a number of characteristics including:  academic 

















somewhat inconsistent findings with some authors reporting strong correlations between MR and 
various characteristics, while others did not replicate these findings. Results from the current 
review indicated a positive effect between MR and academic ability (AA) (ES = + 0.24), a small 
negative effect between MR and political orientation (ES = - 0.07), and non-significant effects 
between MR and religiosity (ES = + 0.00), and MR and personality (ES = + 0.01). Possible ways 
of understanding these findings will be discussed.  
 Results from the current study indicated that higher academic ability was associated with 
higher MR scores, signifying a positive relationship between MR and AA. This reflects a 
moderate relationship and explains a fraction of the variance in MR scores. The moderate 
relationship evident between AA and MR may be partly due to influential factors such as 
personal motivation, parental or peer group influence and IQ. This finding aligns with previous 
research (Crowson et al., 2007; Derryberry et al., 2005; Mayhew, 2012; Mayhew et al., 2012; 
Thoma et al., 2009). Derryberry et al. (2007) suggest that MR develops in combination with 
cognitive abilities. Rest (1979b) suggests that the DIT and IQ scores relate in a similar way to 
reported findings for IQ scores and other indices of cognitive development. This assumption is 
echoed by Thoma (2002) suggesting that while the overlap should not be excessive, tests which 
claim to be cognitive should correlate with other cognitive ability measures.  
 Kohlberg and Power (1981) argue religious persuasion has no influence on the 
psychology of moral decision-making. Results from the current study corroborate this 
perspective indicating non-significant effects between MR and religiosity (ES = + 0.00). 

















suggesting the need for a strong source for morality often lauded as increasingly missing in 
public life and education (Hunter, 2000; Taylor, 1989). Individuals that specify a religious 
identity often commit to a particular religious and moral code. Carnes, Lickel and Janoff-Bulman 
(2015) suggest that religious institutions and traditions foster respect for authority, sacred 
practices and ingroup loyalty that can bond members to a cooperative and trustful community. 
However, adherence to certain values and ingroup loyalty can also encourage negative attitudes 
and even violence towards outgroups. Equally, individuals may make decisions that do not align 
with the group code and face disapproval from a group, yet remain part of the group (Haidt, 
2012; McKay & Whitehouse, 2015). For example, Allport and Ross (1967) suggest that 
individuals who use religion to achieve non-religious goals (i.e. extrinsic religious orientation) 
often participate in religion as a means to serve instrumental goals (i.e., enhancing social status 
and social identity), whereas people with intrinsic religious orientation often use religious 
teachings to guide other aspects of their lives. Further research is required, as perhaps it is 
religious salience (Roof & Perkins, 1975) - the relative importance of religion in one's personal 
life that potentially impacts decision-making capacity. However, if a compelling societal entity 
reminds group members to make decisions in the interest of the group as opposed to the 
individual, cooperation regarding macro-moral issues may remain elusive (Shariff, 2015).  
Results from the current study demonstrate a negative relationship between MR and 
political orientation, that is, participants who reported conservative views also had lower levels 
of MR. In exploring political ideology/orientation it is important to deconstruct one’s perspective 
of liberal and conservative so as to avoid an overly simplistic dichotomization. Some 

















policies (Devine, 2015). Zschirnt (2011) indicates that self-identifying conservatives may be 
reacting against liberalism while self-identifying liberals may reflect an increased hostility 
towards conservatism. Blum (2013) also argues that liberal self-ascription does not necessarily 
correlate with liberal policy stance. While Hatemi et al. (2014) discuss political attitudes 
variance as explained by genetic influences. 
Chua (2018) describes political orientation in terms of tribalism, arguing that tribes 
provide a sense of belonging for their members. Once connected to a group, tribe members view 
the world through the groups’ lens which “binds and blinds” decision-making (Haidt, 2012, p. 
369). Chua (2018) offers some possible reasons for the blurring of political ideologies or 
orientations. Demographic changes in the US for example, whites losing their historical majority 
status may lead to groups feeling threatened including whites, Christens, and men. Tribalism 
emerges when one tribe believe another tribe’s claims of persecution and discrimination are 
unfounded. That said, degrees of conflict are necessary between different groups for a healthy 
functioning society (Haidt, 2012). Reflective of the sentiments expressed by Chua (2018), 
Goodhart (2017) describes the tribalism of block voting and how it manifested in the UK, with 
52% of Brexit voters selecting to leave the European Union. He describes this as a revolt from 
the more socially conservative, less educated and less mobile tier of British society - pushing 
back against globalising forces that manifested in a liberal leaning system that views the world 
from whatever global perspective they inhabit. Goodhart (2017) suggests that this result could 
never have been realised in the polls or through elections as most of the political party offerings 
in the UK display a shared sense of identity, sovereignty, economic and political values. 

















to leave. Accounting for these arguments it is important to consider how religiosity and political 
orientation are measured. Further research is required in terms of problematizing the 
measurement of these domain areas for example, what constructs are captured and whether 
inferences can be made across different faith/political groups.   
The relationship evidenced between personality and MR is consistent with extant 
literature as many studies have reported non-significant correlations between measures of 
personality and levels of MR (Forte, 2005; Sechler, 2000; Traiser, 2007; Traiser & Eighmy, 
2011). Personality is understood as how the individual organises psychophysical systems and 
makes adjustments in response to particular environments (Allport’s 1937). Personality therefore 
refers to individual traits. Each of the subdomains of the Big Five Factor Model of personality 
infers decisions that are of particular concern to the individual, for example an individual’s 
inclination to control impulses and achieve particular goals (conscientiousness John & 
Srivastava, 1999), to be adventurous and try new things (openness Costa & McCrae, 2006), to 
thrust and be cooperative  (agreeableness Costa & McCrae, 2006), to remain calm and even-
tempered (neuroticism Costa and McCrae, 2006) and finally to be sociable (extraversion Costa 
and McCrae, 2006). MR scores capture an individual’s consideration of macro-moral issues 
pertaining to contemporary societies’ formal structures, as defined by laws, rules, institutions 
that enable societal cooperation (Rest et al., 1999, 1999a, 1999b). Macro-morality exemplifies 
impartiality and being guided by a set of principles. Arguably each of these dispositional 
personality traits reflect individual attributes and may not necessarily align with macro-level 
decision-making processes that seek to achieve societal cooperation. Personality traits can 

















behavior or a changing environment (Block, 1971). Framed by particular norms about 
appropriate or inappropriate behaviour, and ability to achieve certain goals perhaps a tribalism 
emerges in terms of how individuals with particular personality traits make decisions (Covey, 
2006; Robins, Fraley, Roberts & Trzesniewski, 2001). Further research is required examining 
particular personality subdomains and their relationship with responsible decision-making for 
example consciousness and agreeableness. 
Limitations 
It is necessary to interpret these findings framed by methodological limitations. First, one 
(albeit the most commonly used) measure of MR was used in this study, however, there may be 
other measures of interest. Furthermore, the DIT arguably captures ability/capacity, but further 
research should explore measures that simultaneously capture performance. Second, measure 
reliabilities should be considered and could have inflated or possibly reduced effect sizes. Third, 
most studies are quantitative in nature; however inclusion of qualitative methods may assist 
researchers to further understand the constructs. Fourth, accounting for the low number of 
studies and the relatively small to moderate effect sizes, this research agenda requires more 
studies to increase the sample size to adequately detect significant effects. Fifth, many of the 
studies included in the meta-analysis were correlational. Experimental studies are required to 
investigate causal relationships between various outcomes (WWC, 2014). Future research should 
consider study design and quality. Sixth, results primarily involved North American samples and 
caution is needed in terms of the generalizability of the findings. Seventh, drawing primarily on a 

















differentiated concepts of political ideology (for example communitarism and republicanism) 
that go beyond the simple dichotomous distinction between liberalism and conservatism. Thus, 
many commentators advocate a multi-dimensional conceptualization of political orientation that 
distinguishes philosophical, economic, social and cultural political ideology (Blum, 2013; 
Conover & Feldman 1981; Duckitt, 2001; Feldman & Johnston, 2014). Finally, relying on self-
report measures of religiosity and political orientation offers a limitation. Similar to all self-
report measures, respondents may complete assessments in socially desirable ways (Dunning, 
Heath & Suls, 2004). Therefore objective measures could be used to better reflect these domains.  
Conclusion 
 The issues of macro-morality are as real today as ever before. Marty and Appleby’s 
(1993) series provide a contemporary lens to current ideological clashes between 
fundamentalism and modernism or as others detail it, between religious nationalism and the 
secular state (Rest et al., 1999b). These disputes may result in ethnic and sectarian strife, border 
control issues and civil wars (Marty & Appleby, 1993). Therefore, understanding how 
individuals manage to acquire and harness particular positions about macro-moral issues 
(fairness, equity and corruption) are more important than ever.   
 Numerous researchers have appealed to schools and higher-level institutions in the 
United States and elsewhere to take an essential role in the provision of academic social and 
emotional learning (Authors, 2018; Mayhew and King, 2008, Weissberg et. al., 2015). Many 
colleges claim to develop students’ social emotional competence (Authors, 2017; Mayhew & 

















effectively implement such change. A number of recent meta-analyses have evidenced that social 
emotional competence can be improved with interventions implemented with fidelity (Author 
2018; Durlack et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 2017). Higher education is uniquely positioned to 
influence contributions to the academic, social and emotional learning of future professionals. It 
is necessary to reimagine the role of the university and the competences and values that should 
be imparted to students, faculty and staff. Lukianoff and Haidt (2015) discuss higher education’s 
overly protectionist trends leading toward intellectual homogeneity where diverse viewpoints are 
seldom encountered by students. If universities are committed to developing social emotional 
competence they need to balance freedom of speech with equality, diversity and inclusion 
agendas, and provide opportunities where students are exposed to intellectual diversity which 
may at times cause discomfort. “The presumption that students need to be protected rather than 
challenged in a classroom is … anti-intellectual” (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2015, p. 4). 
 The surge in demand for social and emotional learning programs, practices and 
measures is an important catalyst for innovation. This, in turn, calls for renewed focus and clarity 
around what it means to rigorously evaluate and measure SEL, and what it looks like in different 
contexts. With widespread adoption of SEL within our grasp, there has never been a more 
important moment for the field to insist on evidence-based SEL programs and rigorous 
measurement of SEL to lift the future generations of students, educators, leaders, adults to 
achieve their full potential. Results from the current study improve policy-makers, practitioners, 
researchers’ and other stakeholders understanding of the crucial role of social emotional 
competence and the types of practices and policies that potentially support the development of 

















development, specifically as it relates to the development of an individual’s academic social 
emotional competence. However, further research is required on the specific social emotional 
competence prioritized through intervention delivery that results in a range of positive outcomes. 
Measuring SEL is an obvious and growing area of such research and development efforts. But, 
measuring SEL is complex. Given the myriad of frameworks available for conceptualising SEL, 
it is perhaps not surprising that little consensus has emerged in the field regarding measurement. 
For example measures of mathematics and reading are not perfect, but widely accepted 
standardized measurements are available in these areas. In order to gather evidence pertaining to 
social and emotional competence, context specific and performance based measures are needed. 
However, no single test, nor single type of test, can as of yet serve this purpose. Acknowledging 
the limits of self-report measures, they have a place in the field of SEL and could be particularly 
advantageous for triangulating measures such as observation and situational judgment tests. 
However, these measures should be administered independently, that is, independent 
raters/observers ideally blinded to treatment assignment and data analysis. The inclusion of 
measures that minimise potential bias, and triangulate with self-report measures would 
strengthen SEL measurement (Author, 2012) and untimely could improve teaching and learning. 
In the meanwhile, we encourage education providers to use evidence based SEL programs 
(Author, 2018) that seek to address multiple positive outcomes including, but not limited to, 
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Table 1  
Coding Table 












245 First-year dental 




Religiosity DIT2 (Rest, et al., 1999) P Score and DIT2 (Rest, et 
al., 1999) Religious Orthodox Score 
-0.17 
      DIT2 (Rest, et al., 1999) N2 Score and DIT2 (Rest, 
et al., 1999) Religious Orthodox Score 
-0.22 
  245   Political 
orientation  
DIT2 (Rest, et al., 1999) P Score and political 
affiliation (five-point political conservatism scale, 
ranging from 1=liberal to 5=conservative). 
-0.11 
 
      DIT2 (Rest, et al., 1999) N2 Score and political 
affiliation (five-point political conservatism scale, 








72 Journalists United 
States of 
America 
Religiosity  DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Religious 








249 Journalists United 
States of 
America 
Religiosity DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Religious 









Undergraduates  Ireland  Academic 
Ability 
DIT 2 (Rest, et al., 1999) N2 and Leaving 
Certificate examination score (state equivalent of 












DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and ACT English  
 0.437 
     Academic 
Ability DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and ACT English  0.369 
     Academic 
Ability 
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and ACT Social 
Studies  0.536 
     Academic 




























DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P score and Political 
conservatism (1=extremely liberal, 7=extremely 
conservative),  
-0.12 
     Political 
Orientation  
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 score and Political 
















DIT2 (Rest, et al., 1999) N2 score and liberalism-
conservatism (1=extremely liberal, 5=extremely  
conservative) 
0.037 
     Political 
Orientation  
DIT2 (Rest, at al., 1999) N2 score and Political 
identification (0 = liberal, 1=conservative) 
0.04 
     Political 
Orientation  
DIT2 (Rest, et al., 1999) N2 score and Political 



























DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 score and Political 


















DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Right-Wing 





  Political 
Orientation  
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Mainstream 
conservative attitudes (Conservatism–Liberalism 
Scale, McClosky & Bann 1979): Study 1 0.07 
  
 
  Political 
Orientation  
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and Right-Wing 
Authoritianism (RAW) Scale (Altemeyer, 1988): 
Study 1 -0.06 
  
 
  Political 
Orientation  
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and Mainstream 
conservative attitudes (Conservatism–Liberalism 













DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Right-Wing 
Authoritianism (RAW) Scale (Altemeyer, 1988): 
Study 2 -0.29 

















Orientation  conservative attitudes (Conservatism–Liberalism 
Scale, McClosky and Bann 1979): Study 2 
  
 
  Political 
Orientation  
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Conservative 
Political Identification (from 1 (extremely liberal) 
to 7 (extremely conservative): Study 2 -0.12 
  
 
  Political 
Orientation  
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and Right-Wing 
Authoritianism (RAW) Scale (Altemeyer, 1988): 
Study 2 -0.12 
  
 
  Political 
Orientation  
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and  Mainstream 
conservative attitudes (Conservatism–Liberalism 
Scale, McClosky and Bann 1979): Study 2 -0.01 
  
 
  Political 
Orientation  
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and Conservative 
Political Identification (from 1 (extremely liberal) 















DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and Kaufman 
Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (KAIT, 
Kaufman & Kaufman, 1993) 
Definitions Subtest  
0.367 
     Academic 
Ability 
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and Kaufman 
Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (KAIT, 
Kaufman & Kaufman, 1993) 
Auditory Comprehension Subtest  
0.225 
     Academic 
Ability 
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and Kaufman 
Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (KAIT, 
Kaufman & Kaufman, 1993) Double Meanings 
Subtest  
0.253 
     Academic 
Ability 
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and Kaufman 
Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (KAIT, 
Kaufman & Kaufman, 1993) Rebus Learning 
Subtest  
0.193 
     Academic 
Ability 
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and Kaufman 
Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (KAIT, 
Kaufman & Kaufman, 1993) Logical Steps Subtest  
0.11 
     Academic 
Ability 
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and Kaufman 
Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (KAIT, 










































College students: DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and 




97 Gifted youth United 
States of 
America 
Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Attributional 
Complexity Scale (ACS; Fletcher et al., 1986) 
Preference for complex explanations Score 
(ACSce) - Gifted 0.24 
     Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Attributional 
Complexity Scale (ACS; Fletcher et al., 1986) ACS 
composite score minus complex explanations 
(ACScomp-ce) 0.22 
     Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and to High Pole 
Openness to experience (HPO) (Walker, 1999) - 
Gifted 0.081 
     Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Low Pole 
Agreeableness (LPA) -Gifted 0.045 
     Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and High Pole 
Conscientiousness (HPC) (Walker, 1999) - Gifted -0.109 
 Correlation 
Study (S) 
140 College students United 
States of 
America 
Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Attributional 
Complexity Scale (ACS; Fletcher et al., 1986) 
Preference for complex explanations Score 
(ACSce) - College students  0.283 
     Personality  DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Attributional 
Complexity Scale (ACS; Fletcher et al., 1986) ACS 
composite score minus complex explanations 
(ACScomp-ce) -College students 0.244 
     Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and High Pole 
Openness (HPO) (Walker, 1999) - College students 0.18 
     Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Low Pole 


















     Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979) P Score and High Pole 
Conscientiousness (HPC) (Walker, 1999) - College 











Religiosity DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) P Score and DIT2 
Religious Orthodox Score (Rest et al., 1999)  
0.219 
     Religiosity DIT2 N2 Score (Rest et al., 1999) and DIT2 














Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979) P Score and Rotter's (1966) I-E 
Scale (locus of control) 
-0.015 





MBA Students United 
States of 
America  
Personality  DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and Total PPI 
(Psychopathic Personality Inventory) (Lilienfeld & 
Andrews, 1996) -0.26 
  
 
  Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and PPI Subscale 




  Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and PPI 
Subscale:  (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996): Social 
Potency  -0.14 
  
 
  Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and PPI Subscale 
(Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996):  Fearlessness -0.11 
  
 
  Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and PPI Subscale 
(Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996): Coldhearted -0.09 
  
 
  Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and PPI Subscale 
(Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996): Impulsive -0.13 
  
 
  Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and PPI Subscale 




  Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 score and PPI Subscale 
(Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996): Carefree 
Nonplanfulness 0.01 

















(Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996):  Stress Immunity 
  
 
  Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and PPI-1 
(fearless dominance, consisting of the Social 
Potency, Stress Immunity, and Fearlessness 
subscales) (Benning et al., 2003) -0.16 
  
 
  Personality  DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and PPI-2 (Self-
Centered Impulsivity, consisting of the Carefree 
Nonplanfulness, Impulsive Nonconformity, 
Machiavellian Egocentricity, and Blame 
Externalization subscales.) (Benning et al., 2003) -0.28 
  
 
  Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and MACH-IV 


















  1001   Political 
orientation 
DIT 2 (Rest, et al., 1999) N2 and political views (1 








analysis (S) 208 
2nd-year 
medical students 
Croatia Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 score and  




  Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 score and 




  Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 score and 




  Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 score and 




  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979) N2 score and Paulhus Socially 




  Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 score and Paulhus 

















Paulhus, 2002): Impression management 
Maeda, 







from the Centre 









DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) P Score and DIT2 (Rest et 




  Political 
Orientation  
DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score DIT2 (Rest et al., 
1999) Political Orientation Score -0.1 





65 Student data 




Religiosity DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) P Score and Religiosity 
(institutional religious affiliation: 
Secular/Religious)  
0.186 
     Religiosity DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and Religiosity 









Study (S)  
115 First year 
psychology 
students  
Australia  Academic 
Ability 
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) and P Score Verbal Ability 
(vocabulary subscales from Stankov’s (1997) 
Gf/Gc Quickie Test Battery) 
0.27 
  140 First year 
psychology 
students  
Australia  Political 
Orientation  
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P score and Political score 
(Political Questionnaire - a 28-item shortened form 
of the questionnaire employed in Marx et al. 
(2006). Respondents were required to indicate 
whether or not they supported each of 28 political 
policies (e.g. death penalty, abortion) on a 5-point 



































































Religiosity DIT2 (Rest, et al., 1999) N2 Score and Spiritual 

















Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975): 
Achievement via Independence Subscale 0.44 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975): 
Intellectual Efficiency Subscale  0.36 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975): 
Tolerance Subscale  0.32 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975): 
Responsibility Subscale  0.32 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975): 









Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975): 
Achievement via Independence Subscale 0.48 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale(Gough, 1975): 
Intellectual Efficiency Subscale 0.38 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975) : 
Tolerance Subscale 0.45 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975): 
Responsibility Subscale 0.31 

















Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975) : 









Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975): 
Achievement via Independence Subscale 0.4 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975): 
Intellectual Efficiency 0.34 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and California 




  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and California 





  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975): 










Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975): 
Achievement via Independence Subscale 0.48 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975): 
Intellectual Efficiency Subscale 0.42 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975): 
Tolerance Subscale 0.39 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975): 
Responsibility Subscale 0.33 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and California 
Psychological Inventory Scale (Gough, 1975): 
Capacity for status Subscale 0.32 
Narvaez,  













DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P score and Political ideology 























Study (S)  







DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Academic skill 
(AP, Academic Profile)  
0.33 
     Academic 
Ability 
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and Academic skill 
(AP, Academic Profile)  
 
0.3 
  56   Religiosity DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Bible knowledge 
(Standardized Bible Content Test, American 
Association of Bible Colleges, 1991)  
0.38 
      DIT1 (Rest, 1979) N2 Score and Bible knowledge 
(Standardized Bible Content Test, American 















DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and Graduate 
Record Exam Verbal Ability score (GREV) 
0.366 
     Academic 
Ability 
DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) P Score Graduate Record 























  998   Political 
orientation 
DIT 2 (Rest, et al., 1999) N2 and political views (1 













Italy  Political 
orientation 
DIT 1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and political affiliation 
(10-point scale, from 1 = extreme left - liberal to 10 









































Pope (2004) Study (S)  students information 
given.  
Scale (Christie & Geis, 1970) 
     Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and Ethical 
Rating A (Richmond Pope, 2004)  -0.273 
     Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and Ethical 














DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) P Score and Political 
orientation (Conservative/Moderate/Liberal) 
0.308 
     Political 
Orientation  













Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Science Teaching 
Efficacy Belief Instrument (STEBI, Riggs & 
Enochs, 1990): Outcome Efficacy -0.16 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Science Teaching 
Efficacy Belief Instrument (STEBI, Riggs & 
Enochs, 1990): Self Efficacy -0.01 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and EF1 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Emotional energy  -0.16 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and EF2 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Emotional Stress 0.2 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and EF3 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Optimism  -0.26 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and EF4 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Self-esteem  0.12 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and EF5 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Commitment to work -0.07 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and EF6 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Attention to detail -0.07 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979) P Score and EF7 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Desire for change -0.21 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and EF8 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Courage 0.32 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and EF9 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Self-direction 0.21 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979) P Score and ET10 (Simmons & 



















  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and ET11 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Tolerance -0.24 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and ET12 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Consideration for others -0.25 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and EF13 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Sociability  0.29 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and The Myers-Briggs 
Type Indicator: Extroversion-Introversion Scale 
(Briggs, 1987) 0.19 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and The Myers-Briggs 




  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and The Myers-Briggs 
Type Indicator: Thinking Feeling Scale -0.04 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and The Myers-Briggs 
Type Indicator: Judgment-Perception Scale 
(Briggs, 1987) -0.11 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and Science Teaching 
Efficacy Belief Instrument (STEBI, Riggs & 
Enochs, 1990): Outcome Efficacy -0.15 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and Science Teaching 
Efficacy Belief Instrument (STEBI, Riggs & 
Enochs, 1990): Self Efficacy 0.04 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and EF1 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Emotional Energy  0.12 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and EF2 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Emotional Stress 0.19 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and EF3 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Optimism -0.33 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and EF4 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Self-esteem 0.02 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and EF5 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Commitment to work -0.1 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and EF6 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): -0.22 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and EF7 (Simmons & 



















  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and EF8 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Courage 0.51 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and EF9 (Simmons & 
Simmons, 1997): Self-direction 0.4 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and ET10 (Simmons 
& Simmons, 1997): Assertiveness 0.46 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and ET11 (Simmons 
& Simmons, 1997): Tolerance -0.44 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and ET12 (Simmons 
& Simmons, 1997): Consideration of others  -0.41 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and EF13 (Simmons 
& Simmons, 1997): Sociability  0.08 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and The Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator:  Extroversion-Introversion 
Scale (Briggs, 1987) 0.11 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and The Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator: Sensing-Intuiting Scale -0.13 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and The Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator: Thinking Feeling Scale 
(Briggs, 1987)  0.05 
  
 
  Personality DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) N2 Score and The Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator: Judgment-Perception Scale 














DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Scores and GPA scores  0.265 




Study (S)  
141 Norwegian men 
and women  
 
Norway  Academic 
Ability 
DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Verbal Ability 
(Vocabulary sub test of the Wechsler Adult 
intelligence Scale) (Wechsler, 1955) 
0.35 




161 College students United 
States of 
America 
Religiosity Short Form DIT1 (Rest, 1993) P Score and 














DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) P2 Score and ACT English 
Score 
0.32 

















Ability Studies score 
  146   Religiosity DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) P2 Score and Religious 
Fundamentalism (Brown & Lowe's Inventory of 
Religious Belief, 1951)  
0.12 
     Religiosity DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Religious 
Fundamentalism (Brown & Lowe's Inventory of 








268 College students United 
States of 
America 
Religiosity DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Orthodoxy (Batson 




























DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and GPA scores  0.16 
  206   Personality DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 score and NPI 
(Narcissistic Personality Inventory) (Raskin & Hall 
(1979) 
-0.07 








Religiosity  DIT 2 (Rest et al. 1999) and church attendance 





 792   Religiosity DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) P Score and Religiosity 
(Religious Participation - No participation, Little 
participation, Somewhat active, Highly active, 
Extremely active) 
-0.053 
     Religiosity DIT2 (Rest et al., 1999) N2 Score and Religiosity 
(Religious Participation - No participation, Little 















Religiosity DIT2 N2 Score (Rest et al., 1999) and DIT2 (Rest 
et al., 1999) Religious Orthodoxy Score 
-0.123 
  397   Political 
orientation 
DIT N2 (Rest, et al., 1999) and DIT 2 (Rest, et al., 

































Australia  Religiosity DIT1 P Score (Rest, 1979a) and Religious 





248    DIT1 P Score (Rest, 1979a) and Religious 
Affiliation (Catholicism, Protestant, 











Fiji Islands and 
Singapore 
Fiji  Religiosity DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Fijians Religious 
Commitment (5-point Likert scale (1 = no 
commitment to 5 = strongly committed).  
0.039 
  134  Singapore Religiosity DIT1 (Rest, 1979a) P Score and Singaporeans 
Religious Commitment (5-point Likert scale (1 = 



















Overall Effect Sizes  
Model Effect size and 95% 
confidence interval 
Test of null Heterogeneity 




limit Z-value p-value Q-Value df (Q) p-Value 
Moral Reasoning and Academic Ability 
Fixed 19 0.19 0.17 0.21 15.87 0.00 61.96 18 0.00 
Random 19 0.24 0.19 0.28 9.45 0.00    
Moral Reasoning and Religiosity 
Fixed 16 -0.05 -0.08 -0.01 -2.61 0.01 74.46 15 0.00 
Random 16 -0.00 -0.08 0.08 -0.08 0.94    
Moral Reasoning and Political Orientation 
Fixed 15 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -9.48 0.00 96.27 14 0.00 
Random 15 -0.07 -0.13 -0.01 -2.34 0.02    
Moral Reasoning Ability and Personality 
Fixed 8 0.16 0.14 0.18 13.88 0.00 317.01 7 0.00 
Random 8 0.01 -0.16 0.17 0.10 0.92    
* Note: This analysis includes 18 studies with 19 independent effect sizes for correlations between moral reasoning 
and academic ability, 15 studies with 16 independent effect sizes for correlations between moral reasoning and 
religiosity, 14 studies with 15 independent effect sizes for correlations between moral reasoning and political 





























limit Q-Value df (Q) p-Value 
Moral Reasoning and Academic Ability 
Small (≤250) 12 0.33 0.27 0.38    











Moral Reasoning and Religiosity 
Small (≤250) 11 0.04 -0.09 0.16    











Moral Reasoning and Political Orientation 
Small (≤250) 9 -0.14 -0.21 -0.07    
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